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Abetract-In this paper we propose mathematical 
performance measures by which the robustness, im- 
perceptibility and information content of various wa- 
termarking methods could be measured. These mea- 
sures rely in the notion of equivalence in the per- 
ceptual domain and some basic information-theoretic 
concepts. Based on these measures we show that the 
success of image watermarking heavily depend on the 
functional form of the human visual system percep- 
tual mask. We also analyze the implication for ro- 
bust watermarking of some commonly used perceptual 
masks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The global Internet has greatly facilitated the legal and 
ilegal sharing of information, including digital images.The 
process of watermarking involves adding an information 
vector to a digital image in such a way that its ownership 
or copyright can be enforced. The added information, 
which must be visually imperceptible, is considered the 
watermark. The human visual system (HVS) has known 
characteristics that allow certain changes to the pixel val- 
ues in an image to go undetected these phenomena are 
collectibly known as perceptual masking [6], [3]. An at- 
tack occurs when a third party modifies the image in order 
to remove the watermark [2], [4]. As long the image has 
not suffered too much degradation, the watermark must 
still be readable in the modified image. Most of the ac- 
tual methods for watermarking are based on an embed- 
ding technique known as baseband pulse modulation. Our 
reseach has found matematical conditions that indicate 
when these methods have an inherent weakness against a 
class of simple additive random noise attacks, assuming 
that the attacker has the same knwoledge of perceptual 
mask. 
11. THE DIGITAL WATERMARKING MODEL 
The classic setup for the watermarking problem is 
shown in figure 1. In this figure, I is the original image, 
modeled as the output of a discrete random source. The 
watermark W is a message from a set W = {CO, . . .M} 
and K is a secret key. The first part of the process deals 
with the actual watermarking E of the image. Next, the 
watermarked version I, goes through a noisy channel C, 
and is transformed into I,. The channel models both 
intentional and unintentional attacks on the image. The 
Fig. 1. Classical Watermarking Model. 
basic assumption is that the secret key is unknown, there 
fore the noisy channel can be modeled by the probability 
distribution PZp (I,lI,). 
The third stage of the process is the receiver side: The 
function R attempts to recover an approximation of the 
watermark message W’ using the attacked (or noisy) im- 
age I,, and the knowledge of the secret key. 
111. IMAGE SPACE AND PERCEPTUAL SETS 
Digital image I is a vector in Z S x d  dimensional space 
where d = n x m is the size of the image under consider- 
ation. We call two images of the same width and height 
and color space compatible. I is a vectorized representa- 
tion of the more common used image representation as 2D 
array of pixels, being each pixel a triplet < r ,g ,  b > with 
r , g , b E Z .  
A perceptual pseudometric cp takes in account the short- 
comings of the human visual system, and defines a metric 
under which two slightly different images (in the MSE 
sense) 11 and I2 are perceptually equivalent (equal). To 
be precise, this property makes the perceptual metric a 
pseudemetric: 
(1) I1 I2 cp(Il,I2) = 0 
There is no short-term hope of finding the true cp func- 
tion, since the perceptibility of distortions in images is a 
subjective function of the eye and brain and varies from 
subject to subject, and changes according to how tests are 
performed. 
1)  The CPTL set: A standard test involves a subject 
looking at two images either in sequence or side-by-side for 
a brief period of time, the subject is directed to indicate 
when two images are perceptually different. In the image 
10* Mediterranean Electrotechnical Conference, MEleCon 2000, Vol. I1 669 
0-7803-6290-X/W$10.00 02000 IEEE 
space, the CPTL defines a set of images (vectors in the 
space) that are all perceptually equivalent. 
Let II E CPTL(I,) be the CPTL set of the original 
image. Now define U(%), the vector that upper bounds 
the entire set as: 
V(z) = max {I(z)} 
IEn 
and define L(z),  the vector that lower bounds the CPTL 
set as: 
L(z)  min {I(z)} 
I€n 
These vectors can be constructed plotting all the images 
that belong to the CPTL set, and then taking the maxi- 
mum and minimum at every point. Note also that these 
vectors each define two images that should also belongs 
to n. 
2) The A M 0  Set: Another important set is the set of 
images that are generated by processing of the original 
image in manners that are unrelated to watermarking. 
Mirroring, filtering and JPEG compression are some ex- 
amples of this type of processing. The AM0 set is defined 
as the set of images that are generated by minor modifi- 
cations to the original image not including those required 
to  insert a watermark. All the images are perceptually 
equivalent t o  the original. 
3) The PTL Set: The CPTL set comes from side-by- 
side comparisons of images, but the original versus the 
modified image comparison is only available to the image 
creator. All other observers will not see both images side- 
by-side, and actually they only see I,, the watermarked 
image. The PTL set is defined as the set of all perceptu- 
ally equivalent images from memory recall. Therefore, in 
the case of a watermarked image, the level to which an im- 
age appears distorted is more subjective and more relaxed 
than the threshold for the image creator. This leads to a 
bigger set of equivalent images called the PTL set. The 
following relation is assumed to hold among these sets: 
I E AMO(I )  E CPTL(I) c PTL(I) (2) 
A typical interplay between these different sets is shown 
in figure 2 with I being the original image vector. 
The PLT set is important because an attacker can toler- 
ate more distortion than the image creator; and therefore, 
an attack can insert more distortion than the watermark 
process itself. The PTL set can be conveniently approxi- 
mated as the CPTL set over I,: 
PTL(I)  M CPTL(1,) (3) 
However, by approximating PTL in this manner, equa- 
tion (2) may be violated. 
IV. THE OPTIMAL WATERMARKING PROBLEM 
Given the set definitions, we can state the optimal W~L- 
termarking problem as follows: 
Given I and W, generate I, such that the watermarked 
image lies in the CPTL envelope but no further from I. 
I 
Fig. 2. The Different Perceptual Sets. 
Such an image I, is optimal, in the sense that it intro- 
duces as much distortion (power) as possible without mak- 
ing a big perceptual impact on the image (to the author’s 
Maximum capacity comes by using the maximum power 
allowable given the channel characteristics. The maxi- 
mum capacity of the channel must always be used even if 
the amount of information (i.e., watermark) is less than C. 
The extra capacity should always be used to embed error 
detection/correction information or to  add redundancy to  
the watermark. 
For the recovery process we have two possible pitfalls: 
false positives (type I errors) and false negatives (type I1 
errors). False positives occur when the R process outputs 
a valid watermark message (non-zero) when the input was 
an unrelated image, or an image from the AM0 set. False 
negatives occur when the decoder is presented with an im- 
age that has been watermarked and yet it fails to output 
the true watermark message or outputs zero (no water- 
mark detected). 
We will call a reasonable decoder process R one that 
can detect watermarks and also minimizes both the prob- 
ability of false positives and false negatives. 
eye). 
V. THE OPTIMAL WATERMARK ATTACK PROBLEM 
From the point of view of the attacker, a optimization 
problem can be formulated as follows: Given a water- 
marked image I,, limited knowledge about the E pro- 
cess, and access as a black box to  the R process, design a 
process A that has the following properties 
R(A(Iw)) = (0) (4) 
(5 )  A(Iw) E m L ( 0  
and, 
Recall that the best watermarks are those that are clos- 
est to the CPTL boundary, and that the only way to  
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(a) original image and CPTL set 
(b) watermarked image 
(c) watermarked image, CPTL and PTL sets 
Fig. 3. An optimal attack. 
generate them is by having a functional or algorithmic 
approximation to the CPTL set for a given source im- 
age. It is assumed that the attacker also has access to 
this function, and will use it to compute the PTL set. An 
intelligent attacker would then apply an attack with max- 
imum power at each pixel as allowed by the PTL set. It 
can be argued that in this case the attacker will have a 
good chance of success. 
Specifically, Shannon’s channel coding theorem states 
that a binary symmetric memoryless channel having a 
symbol transition probability of 0.5 has zero capacity, and 
therefore no reliable communication over this channel is 
possible [5]. This means, if the attacker can flip half of the 
watermark bits, no matter what coding process is used, 
the watermark will be destroyed. Since the attacker does 
not know which pixels carry the watermark (they are as- 
sumed to  depend on a secret key or on some property of 
the image), the best strategy for the attacker is to at- 
tack every pixel by inserting as much distortion as possi- 
ble given the PTL bound. This insertion will be done as 
a random choice of either addition or substraction with 
probability 0.5. 
If we consider an image a particular example, then the 
reason why this attack works become clearer by observing 
figure 3. 
Figure 3(a) the hypothetical original image in black, 
and the CPTL set represented as an upper and lower 
bound for each pixel. 
Figure 3(b) demonstrates how an optimal watermark is 
placed in the image in six different pixels as two groups 
of three pixels in a repetition code. Repetition codes are 
desirable because they lead to a low frequency watermark. 
Figure 3(c) shows the attacker-computed PTL set su- 
perimposed on the watermarked image and the CPTL set. 
Note how the PTL set as approximated by equation (3) 
does not completely bound the CPTL set. 
Part (d) of figure 3, shows an optimal attack that ran- 
domly pushes every pixel to one or the other side of the 
PTL envelope. In this particular example, it is easily seen 
that the watermark will be undetectable in the attacked 
image. 
In the general case, whether or not watermark can be 
removed depends on the interplay between the CPTL and 
the PTL. Mathematically this can be stated as follows: 
Let i be a pixel belonging to the original image at location 
(z, y), v( i )  the value of the pixel at that location, d( i )  the 
amount of change that the pixel i suffered due to process 
E, mu(i) and ml(i) be the the watermark’s method aprox- 
imation to the U and L evaluated at the location of pixel 
i. 
Then, an optimal watermark will have: 
v( i )  + d( i )  = mu(i) 
v( i )  + d( i )  = ml(i) 
(6 )  
(7) 
or, 
The choice depends on the details of the embedding 
process E. The decoder process R computes estimates 
of mu and ml based on the watermarked image denoted 
rit, and h l .  There are two possible sets of these values 
depending if equation (6) or equation (7) was applied: 
The minimal conditions for an optimal watermark at- 
tack on pixel i are: 
(13) ritl(i) 5 v(i) 
This assures that the approximated PTL reaches the 
original unwatermarked value at pixel i, and therefore the 
attack will be greater than or equal to d( i ) .  An optimal 
attack is: 
(14) 
rit,(i) with probability 0.5 
ritl(i) with probability 0.5 { a(i)  = 
Therefore, with probability 0.5 the watermark infor- 
mation at pixel i will be undetectable. With the same 
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probability, the watermark information at pixel i .will be 
enhanced. No reasonable decoder will recover on average 
meaningful watermark information from pixels that have 
the same value as the corresponding pixels in the original 
image. 
VI. ANALISIS OF WATERMARKING METHODS 
Equations (12) and (13) capture the essence of the op- 
timal watermarking problem. Both of these equations de- 
pend on the shape of CPTL, and both conditions can be 
expressed in terms of the mu () and ml () functions: 
and, 
mr(mu(i)> 5 49 (16) 
We previously showed that if these two conditions are met, 
there is no possibility of robust watermarking. The fol- 
lowing sections analyse two different models of 'masking' 
based on the fundamentals of color and human vision. 
4)  The LSB Perceptual Mask: The simplest method of 
watermarking is least significant bit (LSB) coding . The 
basic idea is to embed the watermark information exclu- 
sively in the least significant bits of each pixel in the im- 
age. 
The lower envelope for the masking function is given 
by: 
mr(i) = v( i )  - mod(v(i), 2 9  (17) 
and the upper envelope function is given by: 
mu(i) = ~ ( i )  - mal(~(i),2") + (2" - 1) (18) 
where Is is the number of least significant bits that are 
considered perceptually invisible. The value of Is is typi- 
cally 2 or 3 in computer displays with 8 bits per channel. 
Let us now test the robust watermarking inequalities 
stated in equations (15) and (16). The first condition can 
be simplified by noting that since mU(i)  = ml(i)+(2lS-l); 
mr(mr(i)) + ( 2 [ S  - 1) 1 v( i )  (19) 
It is easy to  show that mr (ml (i)) = mr(i). Expanding the 
definition of ml (i), equation (19) becomes: 
v( i )  - mod(v(i), 218) + (2'8 - 1) 2 v(i) ,  
2lS - 1 2 mal(v(i), 218) 
(20) 
(21) 
which leads to the condition: 
Equation (21) is true for all possible values of v( i ) .  For 
the second condition, equation (16), we can write the fol- 
lowing: 
mu(mu(i)) - (21S - 1) 5 v(i), (22) 
which can be further simplified nothing that mU(mu(i)) = 
mU(i). This yields the condition: 
mal(v(i), 218) 2 0, (23) 
which also holds for all possible values of v(i). 
Since we have shown that both conditions hold, we 
can conclude that it is impossible to create robust water- 
marks under the assumption that the perceptual threshold 
functions are the ones implied by the LSB watermarking 
method. 
5) The Fixed Additive Perceptual Mask: The next sim- 
plest perceptual model is to consider a fixed additive (or 
subtractive) threshold a. The perceptual masking func- 
tions are: 
(25) 
0 if v( i )  - a < 0 
mr(i) = { v(i) - a otherwise 
Where ima,  is the maximum pixel value. In &bit dis- 
plays ima, is 255. The parameter a is the amount that 
the intensity of a pixel can be changed just before the 
change becomw perceptually noticeable. 
The analysis for this perceptual masking function in 
terms of the conditions for robust watermarking can be 
split into two regions: a linear region where a < ~ ( i )  < 
imaz - a, and a nonlinear region where v(i) is close to  the 
maximum or minimum values. 
For the linear region, the masking function is v(i)  f a, 
and it is trivial to prove that equations (15) and (16) 
are satisfied. For the nonlinear region, we can make the 
observation that the masking functions are equal to the 
LSB threshold functions of equations (17) and (18), if we 
let: 
Is = log(a + 1) 
And from the previous section we have proven that the 
LSB masking function hold the conditions (15) and (16) 
for any d u e  of v(i). Therefore, for any value of v(i) ,  
the fixed additive perceptual mask satisfies equations (15) 
and (16), implying that robust watermarking with this 
masking function is impossible. 
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